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Should Death Be So Different?: 
Sentencing Purposes and Capital Jury 
Decisions in an Era of Smart on Crime 
Sentencing Reform 
Jelani Jefferson Exum* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We are in an era of “Smart on Crime” sentencing reform.1  
Several states and the federal government have made major 
changes to their sentencing policies—from reducing the 
incarceration of low-level, nonviolent drug offenders to the use 
of evidence-based sentencing to focus the most severe 
punishments on those who are at the greatest risk of recidivism.  
Often, today’s reform efforts are spoken about in terms of being 
fiscally responsible while still controlling crime.2  Though such 
reform efforts do not explicitly acknowledge purposes of 
punishment—such as retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
or deterrence3—an undercurrent running through all of these 
* Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. 
1. For example, in 2013 then U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder launched a “Smart
on Crime” initiative, designed to “identify reforms that would ensure federal laws are 
enforced more fairly and—in an era of reduced budgets—more efficiently.”  U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2013), https://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-generals-smart-crime-initiative.  
Several states have similar initiatives [https://perma.cc/RBR2-YTY2].  See, e.g., Marc A. 
Levin, SMART ON CRIME:  WITH PRISON COSTS ON THE RISE, OHIO NEEDS BETTER 
POLICIES FOR PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, THE BUCKEYE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY 
SOLUTIONS 1 (2010) [hereinafter SMART ON CRIME], 
http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/uploads/files/buckeye-smart-on-crime(1).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K3MM-DBYU].  Though current U.S. Attorney Jeff Sessions has not 
supported the momentum of the Smart on Crime reforms (and has even directly opposed 
several of them), many remain on track with their cost-conscious criminal justice reforms. 
2. See Levin, supra note 1.
3. The following provides a brief explanation of the theories of punishment:
Retribution: Retribution punishes in accordance with philosophical views on 
just desert and moral blameworthiness.  Deontological retribution focuses 
“on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the arguments and 
analyses of moral philosophy.”  Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions 
of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 145, 148 (2008).  This deontological approach to retribution comes from 
the work of Immanuel Kant.  See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical 
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reforms is an effort for sentencing to make sense in light of 
sentencing goals given the resources available.  Therefore, 
thinking about ultimate purposes or goals in sentencing is 
necessarily a part of the sentencing reform discourse.  For 
instance, reducing the incarceration rates for low-level 
nonviolent offenders is an acknowledgment that the theory of 
incapacitation, which punishes based on future dangerousness, 
does not require incarceration in these cases.4  Likewise, such 
reform measures make a statement about the relatively lower 
moral culpability of such offenders, meaning that the theory of 
retribution does not require incarceration either.5  Further, 
evidence-based sentencing recognizes that using punishment to 
rehabilitate such offenders may be possible and therefore these 
Elements of Justice: Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals 101 (John Ladd 
trans., The Bobbs–Merrill Co. 1965).  For another traditional account of 
retribution, see also G.W.F. Hegel, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 98 (S.W. Dyde 
trans., George Bell and Sons 1896) (1821).  For a modern retributivist view, 
see Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? 
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2193 (2001).  
In its empirical form, retribution “focuses on the blameworthiness of the 
offender.  But in determining the principles by which punishment is to be 
assessed, it looks not to philosophical analyses but rather to the community’s 
intuitions of justice.”  See Robinson, supra note 3, at 149.  See also, Josh 
Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The 
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 217 (2012) (explaining “the crime-control 
benefits from distributing punishment according to people’s shared intuitions 
of justice . . .”). 
Incapacitation: The goal of incapacitation is for “offenders . . . [to be] 
rendered physically incapable of committing crime.” ARTHUR W. 
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2:3 (2d ed. 1991). 
Deterrence: Deterrence takes two forms – specific and general.  The goal of 
specific deterrence is to “disincline individual offenders from repeating the 
same or other criminal acts.”  Id. at § 2:2.  General deterrence seeks to 
dissuade others in society from engaging in similar conduct.  Id.  
Rehabilitation: Rehabilitation seeks to impart to “the offender proper values 
and attitudes, by bolstering his respect for self and institutions . . . .”  1 
CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 4 (15th ed.1993).  The 
idea is that, once punished, the offender will be reformed and will no longer 
commit criminal offenses. 
4. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Get a Little Less Tough on Crime: American Prisons
Are Unjustly Overcrowded, and It’s Time to Change That, U.S. NEWS (May 9, 2014, 1:00 
PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/05/09/its-time-for-prison-reform-and-
an-end-to-mandatory-minimum-sentences [https://perma.cc/6TF6-UX8K]. 
5. Id.
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evidence-based practices focus on treating the individual 
offender through individualized probation conditions, rather 
than simply defaulting to a term of imprisonment.6  Of course, in 
these non-death sentencing situations, it is unclear what 
particular sentencing purpose is the main focus of the reform 
efforts.  This is because one single sentencing purpose has not 
been identified as ruling sentencing law and policy in any state 
nor in the federal sentencing system.  But, death is different. 
The death penalty is a sentencing context in which the 
purposes have been clearly identified as retribution and general 
deterrence.7  This means that the death penalty provides the 
unique opportunity of having focused conversations about 
appropriate death penalty reform measures necessary to achieve 
the specific death penalty purposes.  With current general 
sentencing reform efforts focused on achieving punishment 
goals while reducing costs, the present version of the death 
penalty is squarely at odds with any smart on crime strategies.  
Today, the death penalty is being challenged on a number of 
fronts—from wrongful convictions to cruel methods of 
execution.8  This paper urges reformers not to neglect a focus on 
capital juries’ fulfillment of sentencing purpose when arguing 
for or against the utility and fairness of capital punishment.  
Reforms in the non-death sentencing context can be examples of 
how to talk about reforming or abolishing the death penalty. 
It appears as though juries’ decisions on whether to impose 
death from case to case are divorced from our usual thinking on 
achieving the goals of sentencing in individual sentencing 
determinations made by judges.  Though we do not know a lot 
6. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing:  The Application of Principles of
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, x, 634 (2009) (arguing 
for smarter and more individualized sentencing and corrections policies, such as probation, 
to more effectively treat offenders than incarceration). 
7. “The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
183 (1976). 
8. RICHARD C. DIETER, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY
IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 8 (2009), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009YearEndReport.pdf, the Death Penalty 
Information Center (DPIC) [https://perma.cc/4ENU-HH3F ], (making the argument, based 
on its 2009 report, that the costs of the death penalty warrant its abolishment).  The 2009 
report, however, only makes cursory mention of sentencing purposes.  This Article picks 
up where the DPIC report leaves off by giving much more attention to the failures of 
capital jury decisions to clearly satisfy retribution and general deterrence.   
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about how juries make decisions, we do have evidence that 
racial bias and other irrelevant factors come into a jury’s death 
penalty decision.9  In the non-capital context, such biases have 
spurred reforms such as sentencing guidelines and requirements 
on the articulation of reasons for sentencing.  This Article 
suggests that similar requirements or guidelines ought to be 
explored when juries are sentencing individuals to death to 
better ensure that sentencing goals and purposes are being 
realized, and to adequately protect defendants.  Ultimately, in 
discussing these reforms, this Article questions whether the 
stated purposes of retaining the death penalty: retribution and 
deterrence can ever be realized in our system.  When we think 
about reforming sentencing in general to better serve sentencing 
goals, the death penalty, and thus the death penalty jury, should 
be part of this discussion as well.  And, if we seriously think 
through sentencing reform in that way, the continued existence 
of the death penalty becomes more and more problematic. 
II. STATED PURPOSE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A common refrain in death penalty discourse is that “death
is different.”10  And, indeed it is.  It is our most severe form of 
punishment.  It is final.  The unique gravity of the death penalty 
is what has led the Supreme Court to build certain precautions 
into the capital punishment process—from insulating certain 
offenders from receiving the death penalty11 to exempting 
certain offenses from receiving that level of punishment.12  
Certainly, then, the death penalty operates in a context with 
concerns and consequences that are different from those found 
9. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 575 (2011). 
10. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (“[D]eath is a
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.”).  See also 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (“[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from any other 
punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”). 
11. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the execution
of mentally retarded defendants); see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 
(2005) (prohibiting the execution of those who committed capital crimes while under the 
age of 18). 
12. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (striking down the death
penalty in the rape of an adult woman); see, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 
(1987); see, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 418 (2008) (finding the death 
penalty for the crime of child rape unconstitutional). 
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in the non-capital sentencing context.  Though the Supreme 
Court has given special protections when it comes to the 
imposition of of the death penalty, it has also spoken about the 
purposes of the death penalty with more specificity than it has in 
any other sentencing context.13 
From a sentencing theory perspective, what makes death 
different is that it is a type of punishment that has identified 
purposes.  For at least the last four decades, the Supreme Court 
has maintained that the stated purposes of the death penalty are 
retribution and general deterrence.14  In fact, these purposes have 
been identified as more than mere justifications for the death 
penalty, they are actually required for the constitutionality of the 
death penalty.15  As the Supreme Court has explained, “capital 
punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to 
the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes 
served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes.”16  Therefore, when it comes to capital punishment, 
retribution and deterrence must be satisfied for the punishment 
to remain valid.17  This is quite different from non-death 
sentences.  In the context of non-capital sentencing, most 
sentencing systems operate with a hybrid purpose model, 
meaning that no specific purpose of punishment is the focus.18  
Instead, sentencing statutes often indicate that all of the 
purposes—retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
incapacitation—are relevant considerations.19  Though such 
13. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
14. “The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”  Id. 
15. Id. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441.
17. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
18. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing,
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 528-29 (2008). 
19. For example, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice offers a model for
sentencing statutes that is very similar to what has been adopted by many states and the 
federal government.  Standard 18-2.1 Multiple Purposes; Consequential and Retributive 
Approaches incorporates all of the theories of punishment and reads as follows: 
(a) The legislature should consider at least five different societal purposes in 
designing a sentencing system: 
(i) To foster respect for the law and to deter criminal conduct. 
(ii) To incapacitate offenders. 
(iii) To punish offenders. 
(iv) To provide restitution or reparation to victims of crimes. 
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statutes purport to be concerned with every sentencing purpose, 
such hybrid approaches lead to sentencing with no identifiable 
goals, and therefore, no manner of testing the successfulness of 
sentencing.20  Even if a study were to show that current 
sentencing approaches do not reduce recidivism, thus failing the 
rehabilitation and specific deterrence theories of punishment, an 
argument may remain that such punishments may impact the 
overall commission of that crime, thus satisfying general 
deterrence.  If an overall goal for the punishment of that offense 
has not been identified, then it is impossible to measure (or to 
agree on) whether the sentences available for that offense are 
actually effective punishment.  However, because goals have 
been identified in the death penalty context, we have the 
opportunity to test whether the punishment is actually fulfilling 
its purposes.  To do so, though, we must focus on the death 
sentence decision-maker:  the capital jury. 
Through Supreme Court opinions, we know that the Court 
sees the existence of the death penalty as justified by the 
theories of retribution and general deterrence.21  What we do not 
know is why a particular jury decides to impose the death 
penalty on one particular capital defendant.  Jury decisions are 
safeguarded in a manner that is at odds with the transparency 
that we expect when judges sentence.22  In this way, death 
sentencing is different.  And this difference blocks us from 
knowing whether juries are staying true to the purposes of the 
death penalty or not when they make that punishment decision.  
(v) To rehabilitate offenders. 
(b) Determination of the societal purposes for sentencing is a primary 
element of the legislative function. The legislature may be aided by the 
agency performing the intermediate function. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994). 
20. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality: Moving from the
“Cracked” Cocaine Debate Toward Particular Purpose Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 95, 143 (2014).  “However, simply saying that all purposes should be considered is 
in actuality being vague, rather than particular, about purpose.  It is a way to hide the fact 
that meaningful discussions about sentencing purpose have not occurred.”  Id. 
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
22. Paul Cassell, The Volokh Conspiracy: Achieving Transparency for the Grand
Jury’s Decision on the Michael Brown Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/19/achieving-
transparency-for-the-grand-jurys-decision-on-the-michael-brown-shooting/? 
Utm_term=.5af35037d27b [https://perma.cc/E6FB-3DMT]. 
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Several Supreme Court opinions have given some guidance to 
jury decisions, and we can glean from those opinions some idea 
about what a jury’s death penalty decision is at least supposed to 
consist of under the law.23  However, whether that decision maps 
on to the purposes of the death penalty remains quite 
questionable. 
III. THE DEATH PENALTY DECISION:  THE ROLE
OF THE JURY 
In January 2016, the Supreme Court reiterated in Hurst v. 
Florida, what it had been maintaining for some time—that the 
jury rules the death penalty decision.24  That case examined 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, which allowed an advisory 
jury to make a recommendation to a judge who then would 
make the final findings needed to impose a death sentence.25  
Under Florida law, “the maximum sentence a capital felon may 
receive on the basis of the conviction alone is life 
imprisonment.”26  Death may only be imposed if a separate 
sentencing hearing “results in findings by the court that such 
person shall be punished by death.”27  Because this death penalty 
sentencing procedure exposed a defendant to a higher 
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict, the 
Supreme Court held that it violated the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial.28  On its face, this case is about who (the judge or 
the jury) weighs facts that will increase a defendant’s 
punishment.  In deciding this case, the Court does not mention 
the purposes of the death penalty, nor does it get into how the 
jury’s decision to recommend a death sentence must be based on 
those purposes.  But, what this opinion does highlight is how the 
structure of death penalty decisions is supposed to only allow for 
death when certain factors are found that indicate that the 
23. Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Upends All-White Jury Verdict, Death Sentence,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 23, 2016, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/07d41c5db5bb4123bfa6fc8340de5c8f/supreme-court-
throws-out-death-sentence-all-white-jury [https://perma.cc/3XPU-DR9J]. 
24. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
25. Id. at 620.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Fla. State. § 775.082(1)).
28. Id. at 621-24.
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defendant is the worst of the worst offender.29  This is why states 
like Florida only authorize the conviction for a capital offense to 
carry life imprisonment, and require the finding of additional 
aggravating factors in order for death to be imposed on the 
defendant.30  In Hurst’s case, the advisory jury was instructed 
that it could recommend a death sentence if it found beyond a 
reasonable doubt “that the murder was especially ‘heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel’ or that it occurred while Hurst was 
committing a robbery.”31  These aggravating factors arguably 
map onto both the retributive and deterrent goals of the death 
penalty.  The argument would be that those who commit 
murders in an unusually cruel manner are the worst types of 
murderers there are, and therefore, they are morally deserving of 
the death penalty.  Those who commit murder during the 
commission of a robbery deserve death in order to signal to 
other criminals that this type of scenario will warrant a sentence 
of death, thus serving the deterrent function of the death penalty.  
In Hurst’s case, without specifying its findings, the jury 
recommended death by a vote of seven to five.32  After receiving 
the advisory jury’s recommendation, the judge wrote an order 
explicitly stating that she decided to impose the death penalty 
partially based on her own determination that both aggravating 
factors existed.33  Arguably, then, the purposes of the death 
penalty were fulfilled by the imposition of death in this 
particular case.  However, as the Supreme Court made clear in 
its holding, when a state has acknowledged that death can only 
be imposed when certain aggravating factors are present, it must 
be the jury, and not the judge, who finds the existence of those 
facts that make death appropriate.34  In other words, in these 
types of situations, it must be the jury who finds that retribution 
and/or deterrence require the imposition of the death penalty in 
an individual case.  In this sense, the capital jury’s decision 
should be a purpose-focused one. 
29. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620-22.
30. Id. at 620.
31. Id. (citing the lower court).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge
alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”). 
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This purpose-focused undercurrent of even Sixth 
Amendment jury right decisions in death penalty cases is 
supported by Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Ring v. Arizona.35  
Similar to the situation in Hurst, Ring concerned an Arizona 
statute that allowed for the trial judge, after a jury adjudication 
of guilty, to determine the presence or absence of aggravating 
factors required for the imposition of the death penalty.36  The 
main difference between Hurst and Ring is that in Arizona there 
was no use of an advisory jury the way there was in Florida.37  In 
deciding that the Florida scheme violated the Sixth Amendment 
in Hurst, the Supreme Court partially relied on its finding of a 
Sixth Amendment jury trial right violation in Ring.38  Like in 
Hurst, in Ring the Court found that it was impermissible for a 
judge to find aggravating factors necessary to impose the death 
penalty when the jury’s verdict alone only allowed for life 
imprisonment.39  However, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer 
highlighted the function of the jury in ensuring that the 
imposition of the death penalty in a specific case was fulfilling 
the purposes of capital punishment.40  He focused on what he 
saw as an Eighth Amendment requirement of jury sentencing in 
death penalty cases.41  Though he dismissed the possibility of the 
death penalty to deter capital crimes, Justice Breyer found the 
jury essential to carrying out the remaining retributive 
justification for capital punishment.42  As he explained: 
In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important 
comparative advantage over judges.  In principle, they are 
more attuned to “the community’s moral sensibility,” 
because they “reflect more accurately the composition and 
experiences of the community as a whole[.]”  Hence they 
are more likely to “express the conscience of the 
community on the ultimate question of life or death,”[] and 
35. 536 U.S. 584, 614-16 (2002).
36. Id. at 588.
37. Id. at 607-08.
38. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 621-22.
39. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607-09.
40. Id. at 615-16.
41. Ring, 536 U.S. at 613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 614-15 (“As to the first, I note the continued difficulty of justifying capital
punishment in terms of its ability to deter crime, to incapacitate offenders, or to rehabilitate 
criminals.  Studies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive.”). 
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better able to determine in the particular case the need for 
retribution, namely, “an expression of the community’s 
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an 
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be 
the penalty of death.”43 
Thus, like Breyer, we can focus on the Eighth 
Amendment’s promise of freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment; or, as the majorities do in Hurst and Ring, we can 
focus on the Sixth Amendment’s assurance that a jury will find 
any sentencing factors that would increase the conviction 
penalty of life imprisonment to death.  Either way, an underlying 
concept is that the decision regarding the fulfillment of the 
purposes of the death penalty belongs in the hands of the jurors.  
Therefore, if we are going to make a purpose-centered argument 
about death penalty reform or abolition, the focus must be on the 
jury decision.  But, how do juries make the decision to impose 
death? 
IV. WHEN THE DECISION IS DEATH: WHAT
DOES THE CAPITAL JURY DECISION ENTAIL? 
Though jury decisions on sentencing remain largely self-
directed, the Supreme Court has put constitutional limitations on 
the death penalty decision.44  One thing we know is that if the 
death penalty is on the table, juries have to actually make a 
decision between life imprisonment and death.  We know this 
because the death penalty cannot be mandatory upon conviction 
of a capital crime.45  This means that juries must consider 
something when they decide to impose the death penalty.  When 
it comes to those factors for consideration, we know that juries 
must consider all relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant 
presents.46  Oftentimes, specific mitigating factors that juries are 
43. Id. at 615-16 (internal citations omitted).
44. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1980).
45. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976); see also Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976). 
46. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536, 605 (1978) (“[A] statute that prevents the
sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the 
defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which 
may call for a less severe penalty.”). 
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to look for in the evidence presented are delineated by statute.47  
In some fashion, which varies in form by jurisdiction, juries are 
also directed to consider aggravating factors.48  Therefore, 
despite all that we do not know about the capital jury decision, 
we do know that it is meant to be a reasoned, guided decision. 
We also know that juries are in fact fulfilling this 
obligation to make a decision between life imprisonment and the 
death penalty, rather than just defaulting to applying the death 
penalty simply because prosecutors are seeking the punishment.  
In the federal system, when juries reached the point of deciding 
punishment in a capital case, they imposed life sentences sixty-
five percent of the time and imposed death sentences thirty-five 
47. See, for example, Florida Statutes Annotated §921.141(7), which lists the
mitigating factors that should be considered as: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to 
the act. 
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by 
another person and his or her participation was relatively minor. 
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person. 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her 
conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired. 
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(h) The existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that 
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(7) (West 2016). 
48. Three types of death penalty statutes have survived constitutional scrutiny:
“threshold,” “balancing,” and “directed” statutes.  See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury 
Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1046 (1995) 
(citing Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1980)).  In Gregg v. 
Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s threshold statute, which required jurors to 
find at least one aggravating factor from a list specified in the statute before imposing a 
death sentence.  428 U.S. 153, 188-195 (1976).  Additionally, in Proffitt v. Florida, the 
Court upheld Florida’s balancing statute, which required jurors to weigh aggravating 
factors against mitigating factors listed in the statute in making their sentencing decision.  
428 U.S. 242, 251-58 (1976).  Lastly, in Jurek v. Texas, the Court upheld Texas’ directed 
statute, which restricted findings of death to the jury’s affirmative answer on three 
propositions:  the likely future dangerousness of the defendant, the defendant’s intent to 
kill or level of responsibility for the victim’s death, and the existence of any mitigating 
circumstances which would warrant a life sentence.  428 U.S. 262, 268-76 (1976).  Other 
states have adopted some version of the threshold, balancing, and directed statutes upheld 
in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek.  Bowers, supra note 48, at 1049. 
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percent of the time.49  Across the country, recent numbers show 
that the imposition of death sentences are on a decline.50  From 
this information, we can infer that a decision is being made 
between capital offenders who deserve death and those who do 
not.  What we do not know is why a capital jury decides to 
impose the death penalty in any particular case as opposed to 
others in which life imprisonment is imposed.  If retribution and 
deterrence justify the existence of death as a punishment, then 
the factors that a capital jury uses to make its decision between 
life imprisonment and the death penalty should by related to 
those purposes as well.  But, what we know about the death 
penalty decision outcomes belies this presumption. 
A. The Presence of Racial Bias 
When juries do make the decision to impose death, there is 
much we do not know about what motivates them to do so.  
However, we do we know a few things about who ultimately 
ends up receiving the death penalty.  Overall, a jury is much 
more likely to sentence a defendant to death in cases involving a 
white victim than if the victim is of any other race.  Current data 
shows that although only 50% of murder victims are white, over 
75% of murder victims in cases resulting in a death sentence are 
white.51  When this is broken down by state, a racialized pattern 
in death penalty decisions is even more evident.  Researchers 
have found that in Louisiana a defendant’s odds of receiving a 
death sentence were 97% higher if the victim was white than if 
49. Federal Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (June 23,
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/CFF8-
A8V2].  
50. See Richard C. Dieter, The 2% Death Penalty: How a Minority of Counties
Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER, 1(Oct. 2013), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72BT-8T4K].  While some of this decline in the use of the death penalty 
would be due to jurors not imposing the death penalty at a high rate, it is true that some of 
this trend would also be due to prosecutors seeking the death penalty less often than in the 
past. 
51. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, (last
updated Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DM8V-B26Y].  Admittedly, some of this disparity is also due to 
disparate prosecutorial decisions about when to seek the death penalty. 
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the person killed was black.52  In California, those who killed 
whites were found to be three times more likely to be sentenced 
to death than those with black victims, and over four times more 
likely to receive a death sentence than those who killed 
Latinos.53  The statistics show similar results in North Carolina 
where a defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence 
increased by 3.5 times if the victim was white.54  And though the 
race of the victim seems to be the prevailing statistic 
determining the likelihood of the death penalty being imposed, 
the race of the defendant can make a difference as well.  For 
instance, a recent study concluded that jurors in Washington 
State are three times more likely to find a death sentence 
appropriate for a black defendant than for a white defendant, 
even in similar cases.55  These numbers speak volumes about 
what factors motivate juror decisions to impose death.  This is 
especially true when we consider the statistics for persons 
executed for interracial murders:  twenty cases of a white 
defendant killing a black victim compared to a relatively 
staggering 284 cases of a black defendant killing a white 
victim.56  When it comes to the death penalty, race matters.57 
52. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge
Parish, 1990-2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647, 669-70 (2001). 
53. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Empirical Analysis: The Impact of
Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19 (2005). 
54. John C. Boger & Dr. Isaac Unah, Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina,
An Empirical Analysis: 1993-1997, 4 (April 2011), 
http://www.unc.edu/~jcboger/NCDeathPenaltyReport2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAZ3-
2PKG]. 
55. Katherine Beckett, The Role of Race in Washington State Capital Sentencing,
1981-2002 (Jan. 2014), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/WashRaceStudy2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4AY-NTSB]. 
56. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, (last
updated Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DM8V-B26Y]. 
57. Several scholarly articles and studies confirm this racialized aspect of the death
penalty.  See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty Before and After 
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 38-40 n.21 (2007) (“Most of the studies 
find that the race of the victim is the principal determiner of sentence:  killers of white 
victims are far more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of African-American 
victims.”); see also Mona Lynch, supra note 9, at 577 (“Several recent studies have 
documented racial bias against Black defendants, apart from the interactive effect that the 
race of defendant has with the race of victim.”).  See David C. Baldus et al., Racial 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal 
Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1726 
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If these racialized results were simply byproducts of an 
otherwise effective capital punishment approach, the disparities 
would be disturbing enough.  However, given that race plays a 
part in the predictability of the imposition of the death penalty 
and that we have little to no indication that the purposes of the 
death penalty are actually being considered when death is 
imposed, the death penalty stands as a racially unjust 
punishment option that also fails to fulfill the smart on crime 
agenda.  A closer look at the stated purposes of the death penalty 
reveals huge questions about whether capital juries’ decisions 
have anything to do with current sentencing reform goals of 
fulfilling these purposes in a more fiscally responsible manner. 
B. Retribution 
One would think that the most obvious reason for a jury to 
impose the death penalty in a particular case is to effectuate 
retribution.  One can understand retribution as focusing on the 
community’s view of blameworthiness and proportionality 
among offenses and offenders, which can be studied through 
polls and surveys.58  The Supreme Court has explained that 
“capital punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who 
commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” and 
whose extreme culpability makes them “the most deserving of 
execution.”‘“59  The mitigating and aggravating factors that 
juries consider in the capital sentencing decision are designed to 
identify the worst of the worst offenders.  It stands to reason, 
(1998); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 105-
06 (1984) (finding “remarkably stable and consistent” race-of-victim effects “in the 
imposition of the death penalty under post-Furman statutes in the eight states that [the 
authors] examined” and explaining that “[t]he legitimate sentencing variables that [they] 
considered could not explain these disparities, whether [they] controlled for these variables 
one at a time, organized them into a scale of aggravation, or used multiple regression 
analysis”). 
58. Empirical retribution “focuses on the blameworthiness of the offender.  But in
determining the principles by which punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to 
philosophical analyses but rather to the community’s intuitions of justice.”  Robinson, 
supra note 3, at 149.  See also, Bowers & Robinson, supra note 3, at 217 (explaining “the 
crime-control benefits from distributing punishment according to people’s shared intuitions 
of justice”). 
59. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (internal citations omitted;
citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).). 
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then, that juries decide to sentence offenders to death when they 
are convinced that those aggravating factors indicate a level of a 
defendant’s moral blameworthiness for which a life sentence 
would be an insufficient sanction.  However, this mathematical 
view of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors is likely too 
simplistic.  A better explanation is that “[a]t the penalty phase of 
a capital case, the central issue is no longer a factual inquiry into 
whether the defendant committed any crimes; it is the highly-
charged moral and emotional issue of whether the defendant, 
notwithstanding his crimes, is a person who should continue to 
live.”60  In other words, if the theory of retribution were guiding 
a capital jury’s sentencing decision, then death would only be 
imposed in situations in which life imprisonment would not 
adequately express the jury’s moral outrage regarding the crime 
and the criminal.  A closer look at what goes into the capital 
jury’s decisions, indicating confusion and bias, puts the 
retributive authority of the jury in question. 
1. The Problem of Jury Confusion
Data compiled by the Capital Jury Project is especially 
helpful in assessing the role that retribution plays in a jury’s 
decision to impose death.  The Capital Jury Project (CJP) was 
initiated in 1991 by a group of university-based researchers from 
fourteen states and describes itself as “a program of research on 
how persons who serve as jurors on capital cases make the life 
or death sentencing decision.”61  Its purpose was “to determine 
whether jurors’ exercise of capital sentencing discretion under 
modern capital statutes conforms to constitutional standards, 
whether these statutes have remedied the arbitrariness ruled 
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court[.]”62  To make such 
determinations, the CJP undertook in-depth personal interviews 
of over 1000 juries from over 300 capital trials throughout the 
fourteen states involved.63  These interviews were “designed to:  
60. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 334-35 (1983). 
61. What is the Capital Jury Project, School of Criminal Justice, Univ. at Albany,
http://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php [https://perma.cc/3T4X-E73W]. 
62. Id.
63. Id.  These states include Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas and Virginia.  Id. 
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(1) systematically describe jurors’ exercise of capital sentencing 
discretion; (2) assess the extent of arbitrariness in jurors’ 
exercise of such discretion; and (3) evaluate the efficacy of 
capital statutes in controlling such arbitrariness.”64  The results 
of the CJP data are nearly eighty journal articles and book 
chapters analyzing the data and making various conclusions 
about capital jury decision-making.  A look at those analyses 
reveals that jurors’ decisions to impose death do not clearly map 
on to the stated purposes of the death penalty.  This is especially 
true when retribution is at issue. 
One article analyzing the CJP data indicated that jurors 
often thought that the presence of aggravating sentencing factors 
meant that the death penalty was required.65  Some even thought 
that the fact that the defendant had been found guilty of a capital 
crime at all required them to impose the death penalty.66  Of 
course, this is not what the law allows—a death sentence cannot 
be mandatory upon conviction,67 and jurors must give some 
consideration to mitigating evidence in deciding whether to 
impose death, even in the presence of aggravating factors.68  
Most of this confusion was due to misunderstandings about the 
jury instructions given at the sentencing phase.69  Even though, 
in accordance with the law, jurors were instructed that they must 
give weight to mitigating evidence, the CJP data showed that 
jurors either did not think about mitigating evidence at all, or did 
not understand the role that mitigating evidence was to play in 
the sentencing decision.70  Rather than considering whether 
mitigating evidence justified a sentence less than death—in 
other words, was there anything morally redeemable about the 
defendant such that retribution could be served by a life 
sentence—some jurors simply dismissed such evidence as “no 
excuse for the murder.”71  While these mistakes were certainly at 
64. Id.
65. Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1011, 1031-37 (2001). 
66. Id.
67. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); see also Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). 
68. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
69. See Bentele & Bowers, supra note 65, at 1062-63.
70. Id. at 1041-42.
71. Id. at 1042.
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odds with the constitutional requirements for imposing the death 
penalty, they also indicate that jurors’ decisions are not 
reflecting thought about the retributive purpose of the death 
penalty.  If a jury thinks that the death penalty is legally required 
because of the presence of aggravating factors, or if that jury 
believes that mitigating evidence is irrelevant to the death 
penalty decision, then that juror is not trying to figure out 
whether retribution requires the death penalty in that particular 
case.  Likewise, we cannot assume that a decision to impose 
death is any indication of a jury’s sense of retributive desert for 
the offender.  Instead, it seems that jurors often think that the 
legislature (or in some cases, the judge) has already made this 
decision for them, and their job is merely to carry out the pre-
determined sentence once certain aggravating factors are found.  
This, of course, is already an error.  But, looking even more 
deeply into how a jury decides that those ever-weighty 
aggravating factors exist is wrought with injustice. 
2. The Problem of Racial Bias . . . Again
Another problem with the assumption that capital jurors are 
expressing a need for retribution when they sentence a defendant 
to death is the racial bias issue that was previously discussed.  
Some scholars have argued that the reason for these racially 
disparate jury decisions is that capital jurors, who are mostly 
male and mostly white,72 may not be able to identify with black 
capital defendants and may identify more with the victim when 
the victim is white.73  In other words, “jurors may have a 
difficult time empathizing with mitigating evidence presented by 
Black defendants and, conversely, victim impact testimony 
might disproportionately magnify the loss of White victims 
compared to non-White victims.”74  Therefore, due to what may 
amount to implicit racial biases,75 capital jurors are often unable 
72. Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An
Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty 
States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 544 (2014) (explaining that the process of death 
qualification leads to capital juries that are mostly comprised of White males). 
73. Id. at 534-44 (discussing how racial stereotypes effect white jurors in capital
cases). 
74. Id. at 517.
75. Several scholars and researchers now study implicit bias.  In the death penalty
context, Professor Justin Levinson has done extensive work on this issue.  In his article, 
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to truly give effect to mitigating evidence when the defendant is 
black, and may be using the race of the victim to inappropriately 
add weight to aggravating factors when the victim is white. 
Additionally, scholars have posited that retribution may be 
“inextricably tied to race,” meaning that retribution “cannot be 
contemplated without also considering the corresponding 
impact” of racial arbitrariness.76  It is understood that retribution 
is a necessary aspect of the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
and that “racial arbitrariness is an impermissible consideration 
for imposing capital punishment.”77  This argument about the 
intertwining of the two concepts can be explained this way: 
[T]he tendency to punish crimes against White Americans 
more severely should have been reduced by the 
combination of channeling society’s taste for retribution 
into the formal justice system and requiring heavy anti-
arbitrariness procedural regulation in the administration of 
capital punishment. This has not been the case.78 
This view takes issue with the adequacy of the death 
penalty process, which requires room for retribution, yet allows 
for racial bias to influence that retributive determination.  
However, there is another, blunter manner of interpreting the 
consequences of the racial bias present in jury decisions on 
death. 
The racially disparate outcomes that we are witnessing in 
the death penalty decisions may mean that jurors are actually 
expressing retributive sentiments as their community of death 
qualified jurors see things—that black capital defendants are 
more morally blameworthy than white capital defendants; that 
Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in 
Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 513, 518 n.9 (May 2014), he suggests the 
following resources for information on implicit bias social science research:  Justin D. 
Levinson, Danielle M. Young & Laurie A. Rudman, Implicit Racial Bias: A Social Science 
Overview, in Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law, supra note 7, at 9; MAHZARIN R. 
BANAJI, IMPLICIT ATTITUDES CAN BE MEASURED, IN THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 123 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 
2001) (giving “a more theoretical perspective underlying work on implicit bias”); Anthony 
G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, 
and Stereotypes, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4 (1995). 
76. Levinson, supra note 72, at 517, 541.
77. Id. at 541.
78. Id.
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defendants who have taken the life of a white person are 
especially deserving of the death penalty; and that black 
defendants who take the life of a white person are the worst of 
the worst capital defendants.  When the justifications for death 
penalty were discussed in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme 
Court recognized that retribution “most often can contradict the 
law’s own ends” because “[w]hen the law punishes by death, it 
risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the 
constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.”79  What 
retribution in the context of the racial disparities in the death 
penalty may be risking could be even worse than the brutality 
that the Kennedy Court envisions.  If racial animus actually 
informs retribution completely, then capital jury decisions may 
be forcing us to come face to face with our own societal position 
that race actually determines when we believe that punishment 
is deserved and when we are outraged by death. 
We have actually seen a version of what I would call “race-
based retribution” in the case Buck v. Davis which was recently 
decided by the Supreme Court.80  The case is a procedural 
nightmare and involves the proper standard for certificate of 
availability, as well as what counts as extraordinary 
circumstances for a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a final 
judgment.81  However, what is most relevant to the discussion 
about the death penalty purpose and jury decision making is 
what lay at the heart of Buck’s underlying claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel—sentencing hearing testimony by his own 
expert psychologist witness that Buck being black was a 
“statistical factor” that increased his probability of being a 
danger in the future.82  “‘Future dangerousness’ [of the 
defendant] is one of the ‘special issues’ that a Texas jury must 
find to exist—unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt—
before a defendant may be sentenced to death.”83  The purported 
expert’s reasons for using race in this assessment was not 
anything about the particular defendant, but because, as he 
79. 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).
80. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
81. Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, 672 (5th Cir. 2015).
82. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, No. 15-8049, 2016
WL 4073689, at *7. 
83. Id. at 5 (citing Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 37.071 § 2).
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stated, “[i]t’s a sad commentary that minorities, Hispanics and 
black people, are over represented in the Criminal Justice 
System.”84 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, “You 
have determined that the sex factor, that a male is more violent 
than a female because that’s just the way it is, and that the race 
factor, black, increases the future dangerousness for various 
complicated reasons; is that correct?”85  The “expert” answered, 
“Yes.”86  In other words, this psychologist was saying that 
blackness makes someone more likely to be a future danger than 
a white person.  Under Texas law (and the law of many other 
states), likely to be a danger in the future makes someone worse 
than other capital offenders, and thus deserving of the death 
penalty.87  So, in short, under this psychologist’s assessment, 
being black means being more deserving of the death penalty 
than others.  This is race-based retribution.  Mr. Buck was 
sentenced to death.88  The Supreme Court’s decision to reverse 
the decision below and remand the case for further consideration 
indicates that the Court agreed that race-based retribution was at 
play in Mr. Buck’s case.  In discussing the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, the Court stated: 
Given that the jury had to make a finding of future 
dangerousness before it could impose a death sentence, [the 
Expert’s] report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin 
made him more deserving of execution.  It would be 
patently unconstitutional for a state to argue that a 
defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his 
race.89 
Thankfully, the Supreme Court condemned this use of race 
as a proxy for blameworthiness.90  But, the fact that the United 
States Supreme Court had to step in to make such a 
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8.
87. See Carla Edmonson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future Dangerousness
Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 857, 859-60, 862 
(2016). 
88. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. App’x 668, No. 15-8049,
2016 WL 4073689, at *7. 
89. Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 775 (2017).
90. Id.
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determination illuminates the inherent problems with the death 
penalty. 
The hypothesis that racial animus and retribution are one in 
the same in capital cases is supported by studies that show a 
difference in the racial dynamics of sentences of life 
imprisonment and sentences of death.  A study published in 
2015 found that test respondents who were told that life without 
parole was the maximum allowable sentence were not 
significantly more likely to convict black than white 
defendants.91  However, respondents who were told that the 
death penalty was the maximum sentence, then those with black 
defendants convicted eighty percent of the time while those with 
white defendants convicted only fifty-five percent of the time.92  
Though this study was specifically about the conviction rather 
than the sentencing decision, it makes an important statement 
about the perception of criminal desert—that in the death 
penalty context (and probably throughout criminal justice 
decisions) retribution can be an expression of racial bias.  In that 
regard, retribution is a failure. 
C. General Deterrence 
The principle of general deterrence supports punishment in 
order to dissuade others in society from engaging in similar 
conduct.93  When it comes to the deterrence rationale for the 
death penalty, researchers have been unable to show that capital 
punishment reduces the commission of capital crimes.94  This is 
especially true when the deterrent effects of the death penalty 
are measured against those of long periods of imprisonment.95  
91. Jack Glaser et al., Possibility of Death Sentence Has Divergent Effect on Verdicts
for Black And White Defendants, 39 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 539, 541-43 (2015). 
92. Id. at 543.
93. Alicia K. Albertson, Criminalizing Bullying: Why Indiana Should Hold the Bully
Responsible, 48 IND. L. REV. 243, 264 (2014). 
94. See Jordan Steiker, The American Death Penalty from A Consequentialist
Perspective, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 211, 212-13 (2014); see also Michael L. Radelet, The 
Incremental Retributive Impact of A Death Sentence Over Life Without Parole, 49 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 795, 800 (2016) (“Most, although not all, of these studies [on general 
deterrence] have found that the death penalty and homicide rates are basically 
uncorrelated.”). 
95. Radelet, supra note 94, at 800-01 (“Surveys conducted in the mid-1990s and a
dozen years later found that more than ninety percent of the nation’s leading criminologists 
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Further, there is little to no evidence regarding the types of 
factors (other than race of the defendant and/or victim) that will 
more often result in the death penalty such that potential capital 
criminals are on notice and can be deterred from their conduct.  
Much of this may be due to the nature of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence that is supposed to guide juries’ decisions.  
The problems with those factors have been described this way: 
Some aggravating factors (for example, the fact that 
the crime was heinous, vile, or wanton, or that the 
defendant will be dangerous in the future) are said to be too 
vague, ambiguous, or uncertain to provide any meaningful 
guidance to the jury.  Some factors listed as mitigators (for 
example, mental or emotional disturbance, or drug/alcohol 
involvement) may actually be regarded by jurors as 
aggravators, owing to their presumed contribution to future 
violence.96 
In the same way that aggravating and mitigating factors are 
not helpful to jurors, they are not helpful in informing 
defendants about the types of criminal conduct that will more 
likely result in the death penalty than life imprisonment.  
Certainly a defendant will know that there is a risk of receiving 
the death penalty if he commits a capital crime.  However, if the 
punishment of death is specifically needed to reduce the types of 
crimes that would warrant the death penalty versus life 
imprisonment, then the factors used by a jury do not reveal any 
meaningful information about just what that means. 
What is known about the imposition of the death penalty is 
that location matters more than any specific, legitimate 
characteristics of the offense or offender.  Only two percent of 
counties in the United States are responsible for the majority of 
today’s death sentences.97  Looking to specific states, it is 
evident that geography is a bigger determinate of whether the 
death penalty will be imposed than anything that could possibly 
have concluded that, based on their reading of the extant research, the death penalty fails to 
deter homicides any more than long imprisonment does.”). 
96. Bowers, supra note 48, at 1053.
97. Death Penalty Information Center, THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY
OF COUNTIES PRODUCE DEATH SENTENCES AT AN ENORMOUS COST TO ALL iii (Oct. 
2013) http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72BT-8T4K]. 
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be based on the differences in aspects of the crime.  For 
instance, prior to Connecticut abolishing the death penalty, 
“geographical disparities in the application of the death penalty, 
even when controlling for the differences in case characteristics” 
were found there.98  Likewise, in California, a study by the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California 
determined that: 
In 2009, only six counties accounted for 96.6% of the death 
sentences.  Even more startling, just three counties—Los 
Angeles, Orange, and Riverside—accounted for 83% of 
death sentences in 2009.  Only 41% of California’s 
population lives in these counties.  Together, these three 
counties sentenced more people to die in 2009 than the 
entire state did each year from 2002 to 2008.99 
These stark geographic differences in the death penalty 
certainly are an indictment of prosecutorial practices in seeking 
the death penalty.  However, this data also shows us that the 
decision to impose death cannot possibly have anything to do 
with an effort to deter capital crimes.  There is nothing showing 
that the frequency with which death is imposed in certain locales 
as opposed to others reduces the commission of capital crimes in 
those death-sentencing prone areas. 
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that jurors begin 
to make decisions about the appropriate punishment during the 
trial phase of a capital case.100  The more strongly the juror is 
convinced of the guilt of the defendant, the more likely the juror 
will be in favor of a death sentence.101  This would suggest that 
there is little that can be done at the sentencing phase to 
convince a capital jury that death is not necessary given the 
purposes of punishment.  While this obviously speaks to the 
retributive purpose, it also has implications for the general 
deterrent function of the death penalty.  It seems that whether or 
not one receives the death penalty will have a lot more to do 
with the race of the defendant and victim, where the case is 
98. Id. at 11-12.
99. Id. at 12 (quoting J. DONOHUE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973-
2007: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 8 
(2011).). 
100.  Bowers, supra note 48, at 1087-90. 
101.  Id. at 89-90. 
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tried, and the strength of the trial evidence rather than the type 
of crime committed.  This last factor, especially, means that 
nothing can be gleaned from the death penalty decision about 
the likelihood of receiving the death penalty before the crime is 
committed.  In other words, when the would-be criminal is 
making a determination about whether to commit a death-
worthy crime or not, it seems that his cost-benefit analysis must 
include an assessment of how well his defense team would do 
against the trial evidence presented by the state.  Of course, this 
would be impossible.  Perhaps this is why the deterrence 
function of the death penalty has been given short shrift, even by 
the Supreme Court.102 
V.  CONCLUSORY IDEAS: HOW TO BE SMART ON 
DEATH PENALTY REFORM 
In today’s climate of sentencing reform, if a punishment is 
not smart on crime, it should be revisited.  With our severely 
overcrowded prisons and extreme costs of incarceration, 
sentencing reform is currently focused on reducing prison 
populations in ways that still address crime-control needs.103  
Thus, the harshest, incarcerative punishments are being saved 
for violent, repeat offenders.  And while this focus is on the 
appropriate punishments for our least severe offenders, attention 
needs to be paid to our most severe offenders as well.  This is 
especially true when death is on the table.  When it comes to 
capital punishment, there is little reason to believe that the actual 
jury decisions to impose the death penalty are faithfully carrying 
out retributive and general deterrent aims.  When we actually 
look at what we know about capital jury decisions in light of 
sentencing purposes, we are left with jury decisions for which 
the deterrent effect cannot be measured and the retributive 
element is highly racist with no indication of appropriate 
proportionality.  This is despite the large costs associated with 
102.  Even at the outset of justifying capital punishment, the Supreme Court 
recognized the difficulties of measuring the deterrent effect of the death penalty.  See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976).  “Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth 
of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great 
deal of debate.  The results simply have been inconclusive.”  Id. at 184-85. 
103.  See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs and Prisons: A Lesson 
from Ohio, 42 U. Tol. L. Rev. 881 (2011) (discussing prison overcrowding and costs). 
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sustaining the death penalty.104  If we include the death penalty 
in the current smart on crime discourse, the argument for change 
is quite strong. 
To be fair, there have been several proposed changes to the 
death penalty that are short of abolishing it all together.  Calls 
have been made for changing the way capital jurors are selected, 
so as to not prime the jurors to select the death penalty,105 or to 
reduce the race and gender disparities in the make-up of the 
jury.106  Some have argued for adjustments to jury instructions 
so that it is clearer to jurors that death is automatic upon the 
finding of aggravating factors.107  But, in this regard, we may be 
able to learn from the non-death context as well. 
When the racial biases and purposeless sentencing 
decisions of judges were contested, the result was the 
development of sentencing guidelines throughout the country.108  
Though guidelines themselves are not without problems, they 
are intended to promote uniformity and transparency.  The point 
is to reduce sentencing arbitrariness while also allowing for 
sentencing data to be collected so that sentencing law and 
104.  For a thorough discussion of the costs of the death penalty throughout the 
country, see Death Penalty Information Center, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS (Oct. 2009) 14-22, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/reports [https://perma.cc/EY6H-8THQ]. 
105.  As Levinson explained, 
Although it has yet to be tested empirically, it is possible that even the 
introduction of the penalty of death as an outcome possibility actually 
“primes” the racial stereotype of violent and dangerous Black males. 
Levinson has argued that media, culture, and a history of racial disparities in 
the death penalty have led American citizens to cognitively associate the 
death penalty with Black male perpetrators.  If this hypothesis were 
confirmed, simply talking about death as a possible penalty, the process of 
death qualification, or both, could trigger (or prime) these racial stereotypes. 
These triggered stereotypes of death-worthy Black perpetrators could 
potentially prejudice the ensuing trial. 
Levinson, supra note 72, at 550 (internal citations omitted). 
106.  See Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: 
Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
57, 106-07 (2009). 
107.  See Richard L. Weiner et al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases: 
The Role of Declarative and Procedural Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 516, 
570-71 (2004). 
108.  See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum, Why March to a Uniform Beat? Adding 
Honesty and Proportionality to the Tune of Federal Sentencing, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 141 
(2010) (discussing the development and purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
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practice may evolve and respond to societal needs.109  It is this 
aspect of non-capital sentencing reform that should not be 
precluded from the death penalty reform discussion.  Thought 
should be given to ways to make capital jury decision-making 
more transparent so that it may be properly studied.  This would 
allow for the creation of proposals to address the areas where 
capital jury decisions are not in line with legitimate retribution 
or general deterrence goals, which would also help to promote 
uniformity in the application of the death penalty.  In upholding 
the death penalty, the Supreme Court seems to have envisioned 
such an approach.  When addressing deterrence in Gregg v. 
Georgia, the court explained: 
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of 
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which 
properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the 
results of statistical studies in terms of their own local 
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not 
available to the courts.110 
In the federal system, this sort of statistical information 
about a sentencing judge’s decisions is collected through the use 
of a detailed statement of reasons form that can be analyzed by 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission.111  Without more concrete, 
explicit information on why jurors decide to impose death, we 
are left with a sentencing decision that we cannot say does 
anything to deter crime.  And while the decision to impose death 
may speak to retribution, that moral condemnation may often be 
poisoned by impermissible factors that punish a person for their 
race and the race of their victim, rather than some other 
determination of whether they are deserving of life.  Death is our 
most severe punishment, but we have not paid adequate 
attention to whether it is actually imposed in a manner that is 
fulfilling its required purposes.  While we have this void of 
information about capital punishment decisions, we do know 
that it is expensive, that we sometimes put innocent people to 
death, and that we even botch executions.  In light of this entire 
109.  Id. 
110.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976). 
111.  For an interesting read on the evolution of the Statement of Reasons form, see 
Jelani Jefferson Exum & Paul J. Hofer, The Evolution of the Statement of Reasons Form, 
28 Fed. Sent. R. 169, 2016 WL 1417768 (Vera Inst. Just.) (2016).  
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story, we may have to admit that we do not actually care about 
getting sentencing right if we are unwilling to address these 
shortcomings. 
It could, of course, be that measuring how jurors make 
capital decisions is an impossible task.  When it comes to 
deterrence, one scholar has pessimistically stated: 
[A]fter all possible inquiry, including the probing of all 
possible methods of inquiry, we do not know, and for 
systematic and easily visible reasons cannot know, what the 
truth about this “deterrent” effect may be . . . . The 
inescapable flaw is . . . that social conditions in any state 
are not constant through time, and that social conditions are 
not the same in any two states.  If an effect were observed 
(and the observed effects, one way or another, are not large) 
then one could not at all tell whether any of this effect is 
attributable to the presence or absence of capital 
punishment. A “scientific”—that is to say, a soundly 
based—conclusion is simply impossible, and no 
methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself.112 
Perhaps, given the nature of jury decisions, we can never 
understand what exactly motivates a jury to decide that death is 
the only possible appropriate punishment in a given situation.  If 
that is the case, then we are admitting that we will never know if 
the death penalty actually fulfills retribution and deterrence.  
And, if retribution and deterrence are critical to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, it would seem that the 
punishment’s very foundation is quite possibly nonexistent.  
Certainly, we could argue that we are satisfied with the idea that 
retribution and deterrence may be satisfied.  However, given all 
of the death penalty’s problems, it is hard to continue to 
maintain that putting our resources behind an only theoretically 
effective punishment is very smart on crime. 
112.  See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185. (quoting Charles L. Black, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 25-26 (1974)). 
